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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: STRICT
LIABILITY IN TORT
"In California, a manufacturer will be held strictly liable, if
the article he manufactures proves defective, causing injury to
life or limb. Recovery of damages is in no way dependent upon
proof of negligence or knowledge of the defect."' So held the court
in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.2 in reversing the trial court's
non-suit against the manufacturer and remanding the case for a
new trial. The Ford Motor Company and its retail dealer8 were
held strictly liable in tort for injuries sustained when a new Ford
automobile Vandermark had just purchased suddenly veered to
the right on the freeway and crashed into a light pole. The court
based its ruling on Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.'
In the Greenman case the plaintiff was injured while operat-
ing a shopsmith combination power tool, when a piece of wood on
which he was working suddenly flew out of the machine and
struck him on the head inflicting serious injuries. A unaminous
court held, affirming the lower court decision, that a consumer
could sue a manufacturer for breach of warranty. The argument
that statutory notice was not given by the consumer to the man-
ufacturer was rejected by the court. It held such notice was not
needed where there is a breach of warranty that arises inde-
pendently of a contract of sale between the parties. In addition an
express warranty need not be shown. "A manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspecting for defects, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to a human being."5
There was and still is a question whether this latter rule enun-
ciated in Greenman was dictum or an alternative holding.' The
supreme court has not had occasion since Greenman to clarify
this issue.
1 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 221 A.C.A. 685, 695, 34 Cal. Rptr. 723, 729
(1963).
2 Id. at 685, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
3 This article will not concern itself with the dealer's liability.
4 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d. 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
5 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
6 15 STAN. L. REv. 381, 388 n.27 (1963). See pp. 224-25 infra.
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The importance of the Vandermark7 decision is that it is a
very strong indication that Greenman has established in California
that liability of a manufacturer no longer need rest on contract
warranty, but will be imposed as strict liability in tort. This note
will trace the history of the manufacturer's liability to a user in
California and attempt to determine the effect Greenman will have
on this liability.
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
Originally the manufacturer was not liable for injuries sus-
tained by reason of defects in articles unless there was a con-
tractual relationship between him and the injured party.8 How-
ever, because the privity requirement proved so unsatisfactory in
its application, exceptions to the general rule arose. If the article
produced was inherently dangerous or noxious, a negligence action
could be brought by a stranger to the contract.9 Until 1932 the
California cases tended to limit the exception to the privity doc-
trine to abnormally dangerous articles, without definitely so
holding."°
In Dahms v. General Elevator Co.," however, the court ex-
tended this exception beyond inherently dangerous articles to
those articles which were reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril if negligently manufactured, thus impliedly adopting
the McPherson v. Buick 2 rule. Two years later California in
Kulash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co. 3 officially adopted this rule
when the supreme court held that a negligently-manufactured
ladder is likely to be imminently dangerous, and therefore the in-
jured party had a remedy in tort regardless of his lack of privity
7 Another case decided subsequent to Greenman using it as authority in hold-
ing a manufacturer strictly liable in tort is Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218
A.C.A. 896, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963). See p. 225 infra.
8 Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932). This
case recognizes this rule as the general rule governing the negligence of manufac-
turers and first espoused as dictum in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
9 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Paraffine Paint Co., 188 Cal. 184, 204 Pac. 1076
(1922) ; Morris v. Toy Box, 204 Cal. App. 2d 468, 22 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Means v. Southern California Ry., 144 Cal. 473, 77 Pac. 1001
(1904) where the court held that sulphuric acid is not such a dangerous instru-
mentality that one handling it does so at his peril.
11 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
12 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). This rule, referred to as the immi-
nently dangerous product exception to the privity rule, 74 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1158,
which extended the inherently dangerous exception to any product whose nature
is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made.
13 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934).
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with the negligent manufacturer. 14 This case extended the McPher-
son rule, which did not go beyond liability to the ultimate pur-
chaser himself, to the purchaser's employees, and the rule has sub-
sequently been extended to any user of such a product." That a
manufacturer of such a negligently-made product is liable, regard-
less of lack of privity with the injured user, has been recently
reaffirmed.' 6
Prior to the Greenman decision, in 1963, California had not
rejected the privity requirement in toto. Privity was still required
when the product causing the injury was of such a nature that it
carried no threat of probable damage.' 7 If a third person wished
to hold the manufacturer liable for injuries suffered by him in the
use of such an article, he had to show that the maker knew it was
dangerous and either concealed the defects or represented that it
was safe.' 8
An injured party bringing a negligence action against a man-
ufacturer had to show, in addition to privity with the manufac-
turer, that the manufacturer was negligent and that this negligence
was the legal cause of his injury. With modern methods of produc-
tion and marketing negligence was often difficult to prove. In Cal-
ifornia the injured party was aided by a liberal view of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur.19 Yet, because products pass through
numerous hands, it would often be impossible to show that the
manufacturer was negligent ° and easy for the manufacturer to
rebut the inference raised by res ipsa. While there was a remedy
in contract against the immediate vendor, the privity requirement
was again a requisite and prohibited recovery to any user except
the vendee.21
14 Another exception to privity doctrine was recognized in cases involving
injuries caused by products intended for internal use. See, e.g., Dryden v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938).
15 Varas v. Darco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962).
16 Ibid.
17 Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 605, 161 Pac. 29, 33 (1916).
18 Morris v. Toy Box, 204 Cal. App. 2d, 468, 472, 22 Cal. Rptr. 572, 574
(1962).
19 See, e.g., Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833
(1936).
20 For a discussion of the problems of a consumer holding the manufacturer
liable see Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-20 (1960)
and PROssER, TORTS 497 (2d ed. 1955).
21 See discussion pp. 221-22, infra. The Uniform Commercial Code in section 2318
extends the retailer's warranty to all members of the buyer's household. California
has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code to take effect in January 1, 1965, but
has deleted section 2318. For an extensive collection of authorities on the privity
problem in a negligent action, see 74 A.L.R.2d 1111.
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WARRANTY
Strict liability can be placed on the manufacturer by either
an express or implied warranty.22 But, here again, privity must be
proved. In California, with certain exceptions, privity between the
injured party and the manufacturer has been essential for recov-
ery in warranty actions.2" This, for all practical purposes, ex-
cluded recovery by a consumer from the manufacturer, since the
dealer who sold to the consumer probably bought from a whole-
saler who in turn purchased from the manufacturer. Because of
the hardship worked by the privity requirement, California had
recognized exceptions in cases dealing with food24 and where the
purchaser of a product relied on representations made by the
manufacturer on labels or advertising materials.2 5 The rationale
of these exceptions was that the right of a consumer who is injured
by an unwholesome food product should not depend upon the in-
tricacies of the law of sales. In these exceptional cases a warranty
by the manufacturer to the consumer did not depend on privity,
but rested on public policy and was imposed by operation of law. 8
In recent years the privity requirement has been attacked and
the manufacturer held strictly liable to the ultimate consumer in
warranty for injuries caused by a variety of products, besides
food, which create a hazard if defective: grinding wheel,2 7 bot-
tles,28 vaccine,29 dog food, 80 and airplanes.1 Although a federal
case32 interpreting California law indicated an end to the privity
doctrine in activities other than food, the cases still impliedly ac-
22 CAL. CIv. CODE. §§ 1731, 1732, 1734, 1735.
23 Burr v. Sherman Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695, 268 P.2d 1041, 1048
(1954).
24 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Vac-
carezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d. 470 (1945). Both cases held
that an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption ran from the manufac-
turer to the ultimate consumer regardless of privity of contract.
25 Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 187 P.2d 854 (1948).
26 Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Klein v. Duchess
Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939). See generally 2 JAMES & HARPER,
TORTS § 28.16 (1956).
27 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1961). ,
28 Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963);
Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823
(1961).
29 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960).
30 McAfee v. Cargill Inc., 1212 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
81 Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Cal-
ifornia Law).
32 Ibid.
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cepted the general rule by speaking of exceptions to the rule83 or
finding privity by different theories .4 Hence the status of Cal-
ifornia warranty law prior to the Greenman case indicated a
weakening of the privity doctrine, but a general recognition that
in the absence of an exception a contractual relationship between
the parties had to be shown.
PRIVITY REQUIREMENT QUESTIONED
A helpful introduction to Greenman are two concurring opin-
ions of Justice Traynor which lay a foundation for the decision in
that case.
In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co." the court invoked the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to affirm a judgment for damages
caused by an exploding coke bottle. Justice Traynor concurred,
but stated that the manufacturer's negligence should not be sin-
gled out as the basis for an injured party's right to recover.
Rather, the rationale should be that "a manufacturer incurs an
absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."36 After
tracing the history of the manufacturer's liability through negli-
gence and strict liability in contract warranty, Justice Traynor
stated that the manufacturer's liability should be severed from
the contract of sale and based instead on strict liability in tort.3 7
His precedents for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer
were two California cases 8 which imposed absolute liability on
one using his property in such a way that it injured another's
property.
33 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960), where the court equated vaccine with food and classified the former under
the food exception to the privity requirement.
34 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 347, 348, 353 P.2d 575, 581,
5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869 (1960), where the court defined privity as denoting a mutual
or successive relationship to the same thing or property. It held that because an
employee had the successive right to the use and possession of the grinding wheel
which was furnished by his employer, and which injured him, he was in privity
with the vendor-manufacturer and an implied warranty ran to him. Vallis v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961) used
Peterson and its privity rationale in holding an implied warranty ran from a bottle
manufacturer to a vendee's employee. Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d
33, 37, 77 P.2d 833, 835 (1938), in a dictum pronouncement held that wife of
the vendee husband might urge she was a third party beneficiary of the contract
between the husband and bakery.
85 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
36 Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
87 Id. at 466, 150 P.2d at 442, 443.
88 Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928);
McGrath v. Basich Bros. Construction Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 46 P.2d 981 (1935).
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Justice Traynor pointed out that an action for breach of
warranty originally sounded in tort. Since this original tort theory
of warranty is still used today in such actions as wrongful death
actions, it would not be out of character to extend the strict liability
of a warranty action beyond the buyer to the ultimate consumer. By
employing the tort theory the strict liability of a warranty could
be imposed on the manufacturer regardless of privity. "The manu-
facturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the
changing relationship between them; it cannot be escaped because
the marketing of a product has become so complicated as to re-
quire one or more intermediaries." 9
This was the first indication in California cases of the "risk
spreading" argument as regards the manufacturer-consumer rela-
tionship. Briefly this argument is that since the manufacturer is
usually financially better able than the consumer to bear the risk
of loss that arises from his products and to spread that loss
among consumers, he should be held to a strict liability.40
In Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co.4 the court allowed the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur to be used against the brewer, where an
exploding beer bottle had been handled by two intermediaries be-
fore reaching the plaintiff. Justice Traynor would have held the
manufacturer bottler strictly liable on the rationale of his con-
curring opinion in the Escola case. In rejecting the res ipsa ap-
proach of the majority, which he believed was inapplicable be-
cause too many parties handled the bottle before it injured the
consumer, Justice Traynor argued:
By approving the res ipsa loquitur instructions given in this case, the
majority opinion leaves it to the jury to hold the defendant strictly
liable not only for defects in its bottles but also for defects that
develop in the normal course of marketing procedures. If such lia-
bility is to be imposed it should be imposed openly and not by spu-
rious application of rules developed to determine the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence in negligence cases.42
Again Justice Traynor stressed that a manufacturer's liability
should not be made to rest on negligence or warranty, but should
be based on a tortious strict liability imposed by law. As long as
the product had been put to normal use "public policy requires
that a manufacturer should assume the risks and hazards" of in-
jury incident to such use.43
39 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 468, 150 P.2d 436,
443 (1944).
40 Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See 23 CALiF. L. REv. 621, 625 (1935).
41 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949).
42 Id. at 530, 203 P.2d at 532.
43 Id. at 532, 203 P.2d at 534. Traynor presented this argument in two other
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Against this background the Greenman"' decision appeared
in 1963. Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed
the lower court's ruling that Yuba Power Products, the defendant,
was liable to plaintiff-consumer under an express warranty; that
plaintiff need not give notice of breach of warranty to defendant;
that regardless of warranty a manufacturer could be held strictly
liable in tort.45 This liability which was once governed by the law
of warranty should now be governed by the law of strict liability
in tort because
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them,
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but
imposed by law [citations] and the refusal to permit the manufacturer
to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products
.... [Citations.] 46
Sales warranties will be invoked only to the extent that they serve
the purposes for which such liability was imposed.47
GREENMAN: LAW OR DICTUM?
The question arises whether this statement in Greenman is
an alternative holding or mere dictum. There is an argument that
since the case turned on the warranty-notice issue in the lower
court and the supreme court affirmed the decision, it was merely
a statement concerning a rule of law not necessarily involved nor
essential to the determination of this case and thus lacked the
force of an adjudication.48
On the other hand, there are strong indications that this was
an adjudication of law.49 The first indication that the statement
was not dictum is found in the case itself. Justice Traynor, who
had espoused just such a theory for twenty years, wrote a unani-
mous opinion for the court. Although he alone had adhered to the
strict liability concept for so long, no justice wrote a concurring
or dissenting opinion distinguishing or rejecting the strict liability
argument.
concurring opinions prior to Greenman, Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d
339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d
217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958).
44 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
45 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
46 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
47 Ibid.
48 15 STAN. L. REV. 381, 388 n.27 (1963).
49 This will probably be Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 221 A.C.A. 685, 34
Cal. Rptr. 723, which was decided in October of 1963 and which is now pending
hearing before the California Supreme Court. The court held the manufacturer
strictly liable in tort based on the Greenman decision.
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Secondly, this theory follows the trend of the court think-
ing as evidenced by its attacks on the privity doctrine.5 0
Lastly, and the most important indication that the court dis-
carded the traditional concepts of negligence and warranty and
now holds the manufacturer strictly liable in tort, are two recent
decisions of California appellate courts.
In Crane v. Sears Roebuck and Co.5 the district court of
appeal was concerned with the liability of a manufacturer who had
produced a surface preparer for Sears. The consumer-plaintiff had
purchased the compound from Sears and was injured when it
ignited while being put to normal use. Citing Greenman as author-
ity, the court stated that an express warranty need not be proved,
since the manufacturer was strictly liable in tort. "Liability of the
manufacturer in cases of this nature is not created by contract,
but is imposed by law and is governed by the law of strict liability
in tort. [Citation to Greenman.]"52
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.53 the district court of ap-
peal countered Ford's argument that it had never given any ex-
press or implied warranties with a cite to Greenman "wherein the
following rule was enunciated" and then quoted verbatim the en-
tire rule regarding strict liability. Then the court stated this rule:
"Thus, in California, a manufacturer will be held strictly liable,
if the article he manufactures proves defective, causing injury to
life or limb." '54 Greenman's theory of strict liability seems to be
the law in California.
EFFECT OF GREENMAN
The rule enunciated in Greenman is not all-inclusive, as the in-
jured party must present certain evidence to fall within its scope.
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff
proved that he was injured while using the [product] in a way it was
intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture
of which plaintiff was not aware that made the [product] unsafe for
its intended use.55
50 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d
198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961). Cases in footnotes 27-34 all show this tendency.
51 218 A.C.A. 896, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963).
52 Id. at 900, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
53 221 A.C.A. 685, 34 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1963).
54 Id. at 695, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
55 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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Perhaps most difficult for the injured consumer to prove will be
a defect in design and manufacture. One court adopting the Green-
man rule has allowed the establishment of such evidence by the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.56 Another problem follows from the
requirement that there must be knowledge that the product is to
be used without inspection. What type of inspection? Inspection
by whom? Only subsequent cases will clarify these requirements.
Under Greenman, although there are possible problem areas,
the injured consumer's burden of establishing a cause of action
against a manufacturer has been significantly eased in California.
The decision is an indication that the California courts will impose
absolute liability on the manufacturer for injuries resulting from
defective products, regardless of the nature of the product. Plain-
tiff need no longer resort to the fiction of res ipsa loquitur or show
privity with the manufacturer since the latter is now strictly liable
in tort.
BASIS OF GREENMAN LIABILITY: "WARRANTY" OR TORT?
Although there seems to be a question as to the basis of the
strict liability imposed on the manufacturer in Greenman, Justice
Traynor in his earlier concurring opinions seems to espouse liabil-
ity based on a tort "warranty" imposed as a matter of public
policy for the protection of the public and is not dependent on any
provision of a contract express or implied. In the Escola case Jus-
tice Traynor discussed the theories courts were using to extend
the privity doctrine to the injured consumer:
Such fictions are not necessary to fix the manufacturer's liability under
a warranty if the warranty is severed from the contract of sale be-
tween the dealer and the consumer and based on the law of torts..
as a strict liability. 58
He then sets a broad base for the imposition of this strict liability
by referring to two California cases5 9 which imposed absolute
liability on the basis that "sic utere tuo ut abenum non laedas"-
one must so use his own property as to not infringe upon the
rights of another. The law review articles he cited speak of a
growing tendency to use the idea of liability without fault "in
56 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 221 A.C.A. 685, 695-97, 34 Cal. Rptr. 723,
729-31 (1963).
5T Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897,
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
58 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 466, 150 P.2d 436, 442-43
(1944).
59 Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928);
McGrath v. Basich Bros. Construction Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 46 P.2d 981 (1935).
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placing upon an enterprise the burden of repairing injuries with-
out fault of him who conducts it, which are incident to the under-
taking,"6 and to distribute the loss when harm results to consumers
injured by a defective product by placing it on the one best able
to bear and distribute the loss-the manufacturer.6 '
To use the word "warranty" in relation to imposition of strict
liability in tort presents many difficulties and disadvantages62 be-
cause of warranty's association with contracts. It has been sug-
gested that it is used by the courts simply to enlarge the area of
products liability.68 Whatever the reason for its use, because of
problems and second meanings which naturally associate with
such use, it is suggested that if a court wishes to impose an ab-
solute liability on the manufacturer in tort rather than contract,
it should not employ "warranty" as the vehicle.
Hence it is not surprising that in the Greenman decision the
court does not speak of a "warranty" independent of the contract,
as did Escola. The court alludes to a tort "warranty" when it
states that rules governing sales warranties cannot be applied to
govern the manufacturer's liability to the injured user, which might
suggest that the court is still thinking in terms of warranty.
64
However, the court's specific language that the liability sounds
in tort and is not governed by the law of contract warranties in-
dicates that California has taken the final step in eliminating the
contract overtones in the manufacturer-consumer relationship. The
manufacturer's liability resulting from this relationship now seems
to be a matter of strict liability in tort which does not depend
upon a contract between the parties. Liability arises because the
manufacturer in producing and marketing his goods has been
deemed to assume responsibility to all consumers who may be in-
jured by a defect in these goods.
Michael M. Shea
60 Pound, The End of Law, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 233 (1914).
61 Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss in Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L.REv. 805, 811
(1930).
62 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127-33 (1960).
63 43 B.U.L. Rv. 576 (1963).
64 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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